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The Antitrust Expediting Act-A Critical Reappraisal 
"I venture to predict that a critical reappraisal of the problem would lead to the 
conclusion that 'expedition' and also, over-all, more satisfactory appellate review 
would be achieved in these [antitrust] cases were primary appellate jurisdiction 
returned to the Court of Appeals . .• .''l 
The Expediting Act2 has been subject to some rather severe crit-
icism from the bench and bar. At the extreme, it has been suggested 
that the act be repealed and the procedure for appealing govern-
ment civil antitrust cases be completely overhauled.3 Even proponents 
of the act have acknowledged its need of revision,4 but there is little 
agreement among them on the extent and nature of desirable 
change. This comment will explore the origins, development, and 
current role of the Expediting Act in order to help determine what 
course revision, if it is needed, should follow. 
Section I of the act5 provides that in any civil antitrust suit 
brought under the Sherman Act6 or any later-enacted statute having 
a like purpose in which the United States is plaintiff, the Attorney 
General may, if he considers the case to be of "general public im-
portance," require the suit to be heard before a district court con-
stituted of three judges. The three judges so designated assume the 
duty "to assign the case for hearing at the earliest practicable date 
... and to cause the case to be in every way expedited." Regardless 
of whether the section I procedure for convening a three-judge court 
is employed, section 27 of the Expediting Act provides that, in every 
government civil antitrust suit, an appeal from the final judgment 
of the district court will lie only to the Supreme Court. The act not 
only precludes an appeal to the court of appejlls, but also, since 
appeal lies only from the final judgment of the district court, it effec-
tively precludes the possibility of an interlocutory appeal to either 
the court of appeals or the Supreme Court.8 
I. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 364 (1962) (separate opinion). 
2. Act of Feb. 11, 1903, ch. 544, § I, 32 Stat. 823, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 28, 29 
(1958) [referred to herein as the "act"]. 
3. See, e.g., Gesell, A Much Needed Reform-Repeal the Expediting Act for Anti-
trust Cases, 1961 N.Y. S.B.A. ANTITRUST L. SYMPOSIUM 98. 
4. See, e.g., Solomon, Repeal of the Expediting Act-A Negative View, 1961 N.Y. 
S.B.A • .ANTITRUST L. SYMPOSIUM 94. 
5. Act of Feb. 11, 1903, ch. 544, § I, 32 Stat. 823, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 28 (1958). 
The act also provides identical treatment for government civil cases arising under the 
Interstate Commerce Act. Act of Feb. 4, 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379, as amended, 49 
U.S.C. §§ I, 8, 12, 13, 19 (1958). However, this latter aspect of the Expediting Act is 
beyond the scope of this comment. Discussion will be limited to the procedural 
expedition of antitrust suits. 
6. Act of July 2, 1890, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1958). 
7. Act of Feb. 11, 1903, ch. 544, § 2, 32 Stat. 823, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 29 (1958). 
This section also applies to government civil cases arising under the Interstate Com-
merce Act. Act of Feb. 4, 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379, as amended, 49 U.S.C. §§ I, 8, 12, 
13, 19 (1958). See note 5 supra. 
8. See United States v. California Co-op. Canneries, 279 U.S. 553, 558 (1929). 
[1240] 
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I. BIRTH OF THE EXPEDITING Acr 
When the Expediting Act was adopted in 1903, it introduced the 
seventh class of cases in which appeal would lie directly to the Su-
preme Court from the decision of a single district court judge.9 Its 
raison d'etre, of course, was to speed up litigation of certain govern-
ment suits. Why it was thought necessary to expedite government 
antitrust suits, and to do so by circumventing completely the circuit 
courts of appeals, can be partially explained by an examination of 
the legislative history and the historical setting in which the statute 
was framed. 
At the tum of the century the ten-year-old Sherman Act10 was 
considered by many to be a dead letter.11 It was not being actively 
enforced, and mammoth trusts were abounding as a result of an 
apparent immunity created by the Supreme Court's decision in 
United States v. E. C. Knight Co.12 However, the Northern Securi-
ties case,13 brought in 1902 by the Roosevelt Administration, sig-
nalled the beginning of a government crusade to challenge growing 
economic power concentrated in a few hands. It became ap-
parent that the Sherman Act was to be given meaning and that 
the suits to be brought under it, such as Northern Securities,14 would 
9. Under the Circuit Court of Appeals Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 517, § 5, 26 Stat. 
826, appeals could be taken directly to the Supreme Court from •the district court in 
the following situations: 
"In any case in which the jurisdiction of the court is in issue; in such cases 
the question of jurisdiction alone shall be certified to the Supreme Court from 
the court below for decision. 
"From the final sentences and decrees in prize causes. 
"In cases of conviction of a capital or otherwise infamous crime. 
"In any case that involves the construction or application of the Constitution 
of the United States. 
"In any case in which the constitutionality of any law of the United States, 
or the validity or construction of any treaty made under its authority, is drawn 
in ~uestion. 
• In any case in which the constitution or law of a State is claimed to be in 
contravention of the Constitution of the United States." 
10. Act of July 2, 1890, ch. 647, §§ 1-6, 8, 26 Stat. 209-10, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 1-7 (1958). 
11. See 2 SULLIVAN, OUR TIMES 412-19 (1927). 
12. 156 U.S. 1 (1895). The Knight case held in effect that the Sherman Act did 
not extend to restraints of trade affecting merely the manufacture of commodities. 
13. United States v. Northern Sec. Co., 120 Fed. 721 (D. Minn. 1903), aff d, 193 U.S. 
197 (1904). For a discussion of the history behind this litigation, see 2 SULLIVAN, op. 
cit. supra note 11, at 412-19. 
14. The Northern Securities Company was a holding company which had been 
formed to acquire the controlling interest in two competing railroads, the Great 
Northern and Northern Pacific Railway companies. The issue in the Northern 
Securities case was whether the Supreme Court would bring the numerous trusts which 
had been created as holding companies under the prohibitions of the Sherman Act. 
The question, however, was not simply the method by which the government would 
control the trusts, but more fundamentally whether the government had the power 
to control them at all. This issue was recognized as one that would vitally affect 
the economic structure of the nation. The uncertainty created by the government's 
challenge of the holding company device in Northern Securities caused the market 
for American securities to become demoralized throughout the world. Consequently, 
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raise novel and important issues of governmental regulation of busi-
ness. Thus, it was deemed necessary to provide a procedure by which 
government antitrust cases could be expeditiously appealed to the 
highest court for a final determination. It was hoped that the act, in 
addition to assuring early consideration of vital economic issues,15 
would contribute to a uniform development of the Sherman Act.16 
In 1903 the circuit courts of appeals had been in existence only 
twelve years.17 Prior to 1891, the Supreme Court had been vested 
with exclusive jurisdiction over all federal appellate claims.18 Since 
the courts of appeals were relatively new, they were not readily 
trusted to handle appeals of cases which previously would have 
gone straight to the Supreme Court.19 These new intermediate 
courts of appeals would have to overcome "a deep professional feel-
ing against taking away from litigants the right to resort to the Su-
preme Court for vindication of their federal claims."20 In spite of 
the creation of the courts of appeals, it was thought necessary to pre-
serve litigants' rights to seek review in the Supreme Court directly 
from 'the district courts in a substantial number of cases,21 particu-
larly those of extreme national importance.22 Government antitrust 
cases of the period were considered by many to be of such impor-
tance.23 
Moreover, in 1903 the opportunity for appellate delay was great. 
Before the Expediting Act, cases arising under the Sherman Act 
were appealed to the circuit court of appeals.24 Six months were al-
lowed for taking the appeal, and one year was allowed for taking an 
appeal from the court of appeals to the Supreme Court.25 There was 
the early resolution of this issue was of paramount importance. See 2 SULLIVAN, op. 
cit. supra note 11, at 412-19, 462-67; 1 SWAIN, THE CRAVATH FIRM 707-15 (1946). 
15. Senator Fairbanks, then chairman of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 
stated in presenting the bill on the Senate floor: "[I]t is the purpose of the bill to 
expedite litigation of great and general importance." 36 CONG, R.Ec. 1679 (1903). 
(Emphasis added.) . 
16. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 364 (1962) (separate opinion); 
FRANKFURTER &: LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPRDtE COURT 263 (1928); 109 CONG, 
R.Ec. 11911 (1963) (remarks of Senator Johnston). 
17. Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826. See FRANKFURTER &: LANDIS, op. dt. 
supra note 16, at 257. 
18. Id. at 258. 
19. Ibid. 
20. Ibid. 
21. See note 9 supra. 
22. See 36 CoNG. REc. 1679 (1903) (remarks of Senator Fairbanks). 
23. The attorney general stated in a letter to the House Committee on the 
Judiciary that he considered the type of case which would be directly reviewable 
under the Expediting Act to be of as great an importance as any of the then existing 
classes of cases directly reviewable. H.R. REP. No. 3020, 57th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1903). 
See note 9 supra. 
24. Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 517, §§ 6, 11, 26 Stat. 826, 828, 829. 
25. Ibid. Interestingly enough, however, the first case tried under the Sherman Act, 
United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895), was decided in the Supreme 
Court within one year of the district court's decision. 
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the further possibility of a party's taking an interlocutory appeal to 
the court of appeals from a decision of a district court granting or 
denying an interlocutory injunction.26 These combined factors 
raised the fear that trusts and large business organizations would 
utilize the existing appellate procedure to tie up complex antitrust 
cases in the courts for indefinite periods.27 Consequently, the Expe-
diting Act limited the taking of appeals to final judgments of the 
district court and required the appeal to be taken directly to the 
Supreme Court within sixty days of the district court's decision.28 
In addition to cutting out one step in the normal appellate proce-
dure, the act thus sought to facilitate the ultimate disposition of 
antitrust cases by reducing the possibility for delaying tactics on the 
part of the litigants.29 
Unlike the direct appeals procedure, the provision in section 1 
of the Expediting Act, providing for the invocation of a three-judge 
district court by the Attorney General, had no legislative prece-
dent.30 Apparently Congress felt that occasionally antitrust cases 
would involve matters too complex and important to be considered 
by a single judge, and that the Attorney General was in the best 
position to recognize such a case.31 Three judges would insure that 
the case would receive "as full consideration before presentation to 
the Supreme Court as if heard by the United States circuit court of 
appeals."32 Section I of the Expediting Act was first utilized in the 
crucial Northern Securities case,33 which followed enactment of the 
Expediting Act by slightly less than two months.34 If the juxtaposi-
26. Act of June 6, 1900, ch. 803, 31 Stat. 660. See United States v. California Co-op. 
Canneries, 279 U.S. 553, 558 (1929). 
27. See Solomon, supra note 4, at 96. 
28. Act of Feb. 11, 1903, ch. 544, § 2, 32 Stat. 823. The time within which to take 
an appeal under the Expediting Act, which is still sixty days, is now governed by 28 
U.S.C. § 210l(b) (1958). 
29. Why the act was limited in its antitrust aspects to civil government suits is 
not entirely clear. A reasonable hypothesis is that private and criminal actions were 
not envisaged as the vehicles by which the more important antitrust issues were likely 
to be raised. Indeed, as subsequent litigation has borne out, not nearly as many 
private treble damage actions or criminal prosecutions have caused an impact on 
antitrust law as have government civil suits. Criminal suits are usually brought in areas 
where antitrust law is more settled because of the higher burden of proof required; 
and many private actions are instituted in the wake of successful government suits 
which have already settled the major issues. 
30. See HART 8: WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 47-48 
(1953). 
31. Ibid. Actually, the original Expediting Act did not limit the hearing to three 
judges. It provided that the case must be heard by "not less than three" judges. Act 
of Feb. 11, 1903, ch. 544, 32 Stat. 823. 
32. H.R. REP. No. 3020, 57th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1903). This view is interesting in 
light of the attitude of some toward the role of the court of appeals at that time. See 
note 19 supra and accompanying text. 
33. United States v. Northern Sec. Co., 120 Fed. 721 (D. Minn. 1903), afj'd, 193 U.S. 
197 (1904). See note 14 supra. 
34. The Expediting Act was enacted on February 11, 1903, and the decision of the 
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tion of these two events was not accidental, then it would seem that 
Northern Securities exemplifies the type of case Congress meant sec-
tion 1 to cover. 
II. THE CuRRENT RoLE OF THE Acr 
A. The Provision for Direct Appeals 
In contrast to the situation in 1903, appeals may now be taken 
directly to the Supreme Court from the decision of a single district 
court judge in only three classes of cases: from a decision holding 
an act of Congress unconstitutional;35 from certain decisions adverse 
to the United States in criminal cases;36 and from decisions falling 
within the Expediting Act. In all other direct appeals statutes, review 
is restricted to decisions by district courts constituted of three 
judges.37 Antitrust cases falling within the Expediting Act now pro-
vide the major source of direct appeals to the Supreme Court. 
In a recent ten-year period, about thirty-seven civil antitrust 
cases were instituted on the average by the government each year,88 
compared to one case in 1903.89 It is doubtful whether each of the 
thirty-seven cases today raises issues of equal importance to that 
raised by the one case of 1903. Indeed, it has been argued that there 
is currently relatively little development of substantive antitrust 
district court (then called the circuit court) in Northern Securities was rendered on 
April 9, 1903. 
35. 28 u.s.c. § 1252 (1958). 
36. 18 u.s.c. § 3731 (1958). 
37. 28 u.s.c. § 1253 (1958). See ROBERTSON & KmKHAM, JURISDICI10N OF nm SUPREME 
COURT OF nm UNITED STATES § 167 (2d ed. Wolfson & Kurland 1951). The three-judge 
court is little used under the Expediting Act today. See notes 66-76 infra and accom-
panying text. 
38. Antitrust cases commenced during fiscal years 1954-1963: 
Private Cases 
Electrical 
Government Cases equipment 
Fiscal Year Total Civil Criminal industry Othex 
1954 194 21 10 163 
1955 258 33 16 209 
1956 281 30 24 227 
1957 244 38 18 188 
1958 325 33 22 270 
1959 315 23 42 250 
1960 315 60 27 228 
1961 441 42 21 37 341 
1962 2,079 41 33 1,739 266 
1963 457 52 25 97 283 
4,909 373 238 1,873 2,425 
DIRECTOR OF TiiE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF TiiE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT 139 (1963); 
DIRECTOR OF TiiE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT 118 (1960). 
39. 109 CONG. REc. 11912 (1963). 
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law; rather, the issue raised on appeal is usually whether the 
district court's decision is supported by the facts in the record.40 
In addition, many appeals merely involve procedural matters. For ex-
ample, in the relatively recent case of United States v. Procter & 
Gamble Co.,41 the question on appeal under the act was whether the 
defendant could compel the government to produce minutes in a 
grand jury transcript which government attorneys were using to pre-
pare for trial in the civil action. More generally, when a district court 
denies a motion to intervene in a government civil antitrust case, an 
appeal lies only to the Supreme Court after the final judgment of the 
district court,42 even if the appellant's sole ground of appeal is that he 
was wrongfully denied permission to intervene.43 Such issues hardly 
seem to involve matters of general public importance within the 
spirit of the Expediting Act. 
It is clear that the courts of appeals have established themselves 
as fully competent to handle most appeals.44 And, for the most part, 
the opportunity for appellate delay which existed in 1903 has been 
abolished. Today only two months is allowed for taking an appeal 
to the court of appeals (one month for private cases),45 and only 
three months is allowed for taking an appeal from the court of ap-
peals to the Supreme Court.46 Although an interlocutory appeal may 
easily be taken from a decision granting or denying an interlocutory 
injunction;n in all other cases a litigant must satisfy both the dis-
trict judge and the court of appeals that an interlocutory appeal 
"may materially advance the ultimate termination of litigation.''48 
It has been suggested that the heavy work-load of the Supreme 
Court, combined with the voluminous record compiled in most anti-
trust cases, tends to slow down consideration of antitrust cases ap-
40. See, e.g., United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174 (1963); United States v. 
Borden Co., 370 U.S. 460 (1962); United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654 (1962). 
41. 356 U.S. 677 (1958). 
42. ROBERTSON &: KIRKHAM, op cit. supra note 37, § 171. 
43. Ibid. 
44. See FRANKFURTER &: LANDIS, op. cit. supra note 16, at 258. In fact some Supreme 
Court Justices have lamented that the act deprives them of the valuable assistance of 
an intermediate appellate review. See United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 
175 n.l, 202 (1963) (Clark and Harlan, JJ.); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 
294, 355 (1962) (concurring opinion of Clark, J.). 
45. 28 u.s.c. § 2107 (1958). 
46. 28 U.S.C. § 210l(c) (1958). There is the possibility of obtaining an extension of 
another twe months. Ibid. 
47. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) (1958). 
48. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1958). Interestingly, the Senate Report on § 1292(b) cited an 
antitrust action as one in which an interlocutory appeal might well speed up the ulti-
mate determination of the case. S. REP. No. 2434, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1958). For 
example, a motion that the statute of limitations had run might be denied in the 
district court. On appeal from the district court's final judgment, the court of appeals 
might decide that the statute had run and that the district court did not, consequently, 
have jurisdiction over the action. 
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pealed under the act to the extent that the cases are not really expe-
dited.49 However, a comparison of government civil cases taken 
directly to the Supreme Court under the Expediting Act with private 
treble damage cases which were processed through the court of appeals 
to the Supreme Court, as well as Federal Trade Commission antitrust 
cases similarly processed, shows that the act does in fact expedite.50 On 
the average, it takes an antitrust case approximately an extra year 
to go through the court of appeals. Moreover, it takes the court 
of appeals approximately the same length of time to decide a 
private appeal as it does the Supreme Court to decide a direct gov-
ernment civil appeal,51 even though many courts of appeals allegedly 
enjoy a lighter work-load than that of the Supreme Court and govern-
ment cases are usually more complex than the typical private case.52 
Thus, the litigants, if they are required to take their cases initially to 
the court of appeals, will wait as long to secure that one appellate re-
view as if the case were taken directly before the Supreme Court, and 
the court of appeals order may then be appealed, bringing further 
delay and expense. The cost of a single appeal in either case will, 
presumably, be substantially the same. 
An important consideration in evaluating the merit of the direct 
appeals provision is the extent to which it imposes a work burden 
on the Supreme Court. As previously stated, appeals may be taken 
directly to the Supreme Court from the decision of a single district 
court judge in only three classes of cases. The class involving appeals 
from decisions holding an act of Congress unconstitutional53 has 
not proved to be a fertile source of direct Supreme Court appeals, 54 
nor has the second class, involving certain types of district court de-
cisions adverse to the United States in criminal cases.55 However, 
under the Expediting Act, the Supreme Court heard thirty-one anti-
trust cases during a ten-year period ending in 1963.56 This was 
slightly more than one-half of all the antitrust cases heard during 
that period. 57 In addition, this was at a time when the number of 
cases filed in the Supreme Court each year appeared to be increas-
49. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 364 (1962) (separate opinion). 
50. See Appendix. 
51. Ibid. 
52. During fiscal year 1949 five government civil antitrust cases consumed 19, 22, 
38, 42, and 65 trial days respectively; while four private antitrust cases consumed 12, 
13, 13 and 24 days respectively. These days exclude time spent in informal conferences 
and other preliminary matters. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT ON 
PROCEDURE IN ANTITRUSf AND OTIIER PROTRACTED CAsES 4-5 (1951). " 
53. See Frankfurter &: Fisher, The Business of the Supreme Court at the October 
Terms, 1935 and 1936, 51 HA.Rv. L. REv. 577, 610-19 (1938). 
54. During the nvelve years following its enactment, only about ten appeals 
were taken under its provisions. See ROBERTSON &: KIRKHAM, op. cit. supra note 37, 
§ 115 n.3. 
55. Id. § 176. 
56. See Appendix. 
57. Ibid. 
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ing;li8 several Justices have complained that direct appeals were im-
posing a "great burden" on the Court.59 Since the Court generally 
believes that a party is entitled to at least one appellate review, it 
seems to be more inclined to note probable jurisdiction in cases aris-
ing directly under the Expediting Act.60 In addition, appeals from 
decrees or orders made in the district court after the final judgment 
run directly to the Supreme Court,61 and, consequently, there is the 
possibility of dual appeals: once from the final judgment, and once 
from any decree modifying that judgment. 
It would be conjectural to estimate how many fewer government 
antitrust cases the Supreme Court might have to consider if there 
were no direct appeal provision. But if an intermediate appeal were 
required, grant of review in the Court would more likely depend 
on a conflict in the circuits or other traditional grounds, rather than 
on the basis that a party is entitled to at least one review. The num-
ber of cases heard by the Court under the act in the past ten years 
is small, averaging only three per year.62 Whether a review by the 
court of appeals in that small number of cases which now come di-
rectly before the Supreme Court would significantly lessen the 
Court's overall work-load is open to question.63 The court of appeals 
cannot institute a trial de novo, and it is equally bound by rule 
52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.64 It has been sug-
gested, however, that after one appeal, attention in the Supreme 
58. The following table shows the number of cases filed, disposed of, and remaining 
on the dockets in the Supreme Court of the United States during the October terms, 
195!1-1962. 
1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 
Cases remaining 
on the dockets 
from the pre-
vious term 151 160 205 219 !151 225 281 356 385 428 
Cases filed 1,302 1,397 1,644 1,802 1,639 1,819 1,862 1,940 2,185 2,373 
Cases disposed of 1,293 1,352 1,630 1,670 1,765 1,763 1,787 1,911 2,142 2,327 
Cases remaining 
on the dockets 
at the end of 
the term 160 205 219 351 225 281 356 385 428 474 
Dnu:croa OF THE .ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT 178 (1963). 
59. See United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 175 n.l (1963) (Clark, J.,); 
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 364 (1962) (separate opinion). 
60. See United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., supra note 59, at 175; Brown Shoe Co. v. 
United States, supra note 59, at 355. 
61. ROBERTSON &: KIRKHAM, op. cit. supra note 37, § 171; see Brown Shoe Co. v. 
United States, supra note 59, at 357-65 (separate opinion). 
62. See Appendix. 
63. See Solomon, Repeal of the Expediting Act-A Negative View, 1961 N.Y. S.B.A. 
ANTITRUST L. SYMPOSIUM 94, 96. But see Gesell, A Much Needed Reform-Repeal the 
Expediting Act for Antitrust Cases, 1961 N.Y. S.B.A . .ANnnuST L. SYMPOSIUM 98, 100. 
64. See Solomon, supra note 63; FED. R. Crv. P. 52(a). 
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Court could be directed to narrow questions of law rather than to 
untangling the facts and errors from the typically lengthy record of 
an antitrust case.65 Certainly a carefully written opinion after a thor-
ough review by the court of appeals could aid the Supreme Court in 
determining whether it should even hear the case, especially if the 
case relates to antitrust matters of marginal public importance. 
In summary, several of the reasons proffered for adopting the 
direct appeals provision of the Expediting Act no longer have any 
basis. Likewise, not all government civil antitrust cases raise issues 
which are of such vital importance that they must be quickly de-
cided by the Supreme Court. But because of the automatic bypass of 
the court of appeals, the Supreme Court must decide whether 
to hear such cases without the benefit of intermediate appeal and 
with the knowledge that the appealing party will be entirely denied 
· review if the high court refuses. On the other hand, the act can un-
questionably speed up the ultimate determination of important 
government cases through the direct appeals provision; also, section 
2 offers a valuable tool for avoiding delay in the final adjudication of 
cases of general public importance. 
B. The Provision for a Discretionary Three-Judge District Court 
After 1903, the idea of providing a three-judge district court to 
hear cases of general importance enjoyed increasing favor. In 1906 
this procedure was extended to suits to restrain, set aside, or annul 
an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission.66 In 1913 juris-
diction over suits to enjoin orders of the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission was placed in a mandatory three-judge district court under 
the Urgent Deficiencies Act.67 Subsequently, the provision for a 
mandatory three-judge district court was made applicable to suits to 
enjoin orders of other federal administrative agencies.68 In 1950, 
however, the jurisdiction over suits to enjoin orders of federal ad-
ministrative agencies other than the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion was vested in the court of appeals.69 Although other statutes not 
dealing with judicial review of orders of federal administrative agen-
cies do still provide for mandatory three-judge district courts,70 the 
Expediting Act is the only one which presently calls for the invoca-
65. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 364 (separate opinion). 
66. Act of June 29, 1906, ch. 3591, § 5, 34 Stat. 584, 590, 592. See ROBERTSON &: 
KIRKHAM, op. cit. supra note 37, § 213. 
67. Ibid. 
68. Id. § 214. 
69. Act of Dec. 29, 1950, ch. 1189, §§ 1-12, 64 Stat. 1129-30, as amended, 5 U.S.C. 
§§ 1031-42 (1958). See HART & WECHSLER, op. cit. supra note 30, at 47-48. Jurisdiction 
over suits to enjoin orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission is vested in a 
three-judge district court under 28 U.S.C. § 2325 (1958). 
70. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281, 2282 (1958). 
May 1965] Antitrust Expediting Act 1249 
tion of a three-judge district court solely at the discretion of the 
Attorney General. 
It has been suggested that the gradual demise of the three-judge 
district courts demonstrates that they were an unsuccessful experi-
ment.71 Moreover, since a three-judge trial court cuts into the time 
of three federal judges, there is understandably some antagonism by 
the federal judiciary toward its use. Perhaps because of this, section 
1 of the Expediting Act has been little used, and its critics claim that 
it has been permitted to die a natural death and should be re-
pealed.12 However, it should be noted that when suits to enjoin or-
ders of the federal administrative agencies were taken out of the 
hands of three-judge district courts they were not placed in the hands 
of a single district court judge; rather, initial jurisdiction was 
vested in the court of appeals. In addition, the fact that the Attorney 
General has seldom exercised his discretion to invoke a three-judge 
district court does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the 
provision should be repealed. The Justice Department apparently 
feels there are occasional antitrust cases which merit a trial before 
three judges. For example, in 1952 the Department admitted that in 
the prior fifteen years it had invoked the special three-judge district 
court only six times.73 However, in each of those six cases, the De-
partment considered it essential to have a three-judge court estab-
lished to hear the case,74 although the Department generally recog-
nizes the necessity of not unduly hampering the judiciary with 
repeated calls upon three judges to hear a case.75 
It would seem that the limited use of the three-judge provision 
by the Attorney General reflects a proper use of his discretion.16 On 
the other hand, during the recent ten-year period of 1954 through 
1963 no cases were appealed to the Supreme Court from a three-judge 
district court invoked under section 1 of the act. Moreover, the 
Department of Justice did not reveal in which six cases the three-
judge provision had been invoked, but only that it considered a three-
judge court essential to hear each case. Therefore, although perhaps 
the factors which originally justified the enactment of the three-
71. See Gesell, supra note 63, at 100. 
72. See 109 CoNc. REc. ll9II (1963) (remarks of Senator Johnston). 
73. JUDICIAL CON.FERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT 31 (1952). 
74. Ibid. 
75. Ibid. For another explanation for the Attorney General's hesitation to invoke 
the three-judge court, see Gesell, supra note 63, at 100. 
76. There is the opportunity, of course, for abuse of discretion. For example, a 
three-judge court could be invoked to coerce a single district judge into setting aside 
other matters in order to proceed with an antitrust case. See Solomon, supra note 
63, at 94. One recent case utilizing a three-judge district court has come to the author's 
attention. United States v. Crocker-Anglo Nat'l Bank, 223 F. Supp. 849 (D. Cal. 1963). 
Arguably this case was of general public importance considering the rising national 
trend toward bank mergers. However, the case, which was decided against the Govern-
ment, was not appealed to the Supreme Court. 
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judge provision may still be relevant today, unfortunately there is 
no definitive disclosed proof of that fact. 
Ill. R.ECE_NT ATTEMPTS To AMEND OR REPEAL 
THE EXPEDITING Acr 
Since 1949, several attempts have been made to modify, amend, 
or repeal various provisions of the Expediting Act. The first bill,77 
introduced in the House by Representative Celler, would have 
modified section I of the act. It provided that if, after a three-judge 
district court had been convened at the discretion of the Attorney 
General, the chief judge of the circuit decided that a hearing by a 
three-judge court "would unduly prejudice the dispatch of other 
judicial business in the circuit" he could reassign the case to a single 
district judge. Although this bill would have given the judiciary the 
power to deny the Attorney General's request, the Attorney General 
expressed his approval of the proposed measure.78 The Judicial Con-
ference of the United States also recommended that the bill be en-
acted,79 but it never emerged from Committee. An identical bill was 
introduced two years later by Representative Celler;80 it too was 
never reported out of Committee. 
Another attempt at amendment occurred in 1961.81 A bill intro-
duced by Representative Toll proposed that a national panel of anti-
trust judges be appointed from among the district judges by the 
Chief Justice of the United States, acting with the advice of the chief 
judge of each circuit. When proceedings were brought in the usual 
course within any district, either the Attorney General or the judge 
before whom the case was pending could certify to the chief judge 
of the circuit that the case was of national public importance and 
that the proceedings were likely to be protracted. If the chief judge 
of the circuit concurred, he would designate a single judge from the 
panel to hear the case. This bill was likewise never reported out of 
Committee, and it is not clear what the position of the Department 
of Justice was on this amendment. However, the Judicial Conference 
disapproved the bill on the ground that it would be "inappropriate 
for the Chief Justice of the United States to make such an assign-
ment and designation of district judges."82 Nor did the Conference 
accept the provision for only one judge to try the case upon the filing 
of the certificate by the Attorney General.83 
In 1963, a third assault was made on the Expediting Act. This 
77. H.R. 6451, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949). 
78. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT 13 (1950). 
79. Ibid. 
80. H.R. 3516, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951). 
81. H.R. 6766, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961). 
82. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT 68 (1961). 
83. JUDICIAL CONFERE.VCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT 12 (1962). 
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one was an attempt to repeal it entirely for antitrust cases.84 Under 
the provisions of S. 1811, government civil antitrust cases were to be 
appealed on the same basis as other litigation brought before the 
district court. That is, appeals, as well as interlocutory appeals, 
would be taken to the court of appeals, with the right to seek review 
in the Supreme Court by petition for a ·writ of certiorari.85 One of 
the sponsors of the bill, Senator Johnston, stated while introducing 
it on the Senate floor that the bill also provided for direct review by 
the Supreme Court of decisions in the district court in "the rare and 
important case when such review would be in the public interest."86 
Apparently what Senator Johnston meant by "rare and important" 
was such litigation as the Steel Seizure Case,81 which was appealed 
to the Supreme Court. The procedure followed in that case was to 
have the circuit court of appeals stay the injunction granted against 
the government by the district court, whereupon the Supreme Court 
immediately granted certiorari. While the Supreme Court heard 
that suit without the benefit of a court of appeals review, the case 
was technically not appealed directly to the Supreme Court. More-
over, since cases of such importance occur most infrequently, it 
would indeed be rare when the Supreme Court would permit an 
appeal to be taken in that manner. The practical effect of that bill 
then would have been to eliminate direct review in the Supreme 
Court of many cases which are economically significant and have 
need of expediting, but are not of such a nature as to threaten the 
nation with an economic catastrophe. While it seems improvident to 
dump all government civil antitrust appeals in the Supreme Court's 
lap directly from the district courts, some antitrust cases do warrant 
expedition,88 and to the extent that the proposal would have elimi-
nated them from consideration, it would seem too harsh. 
The fourth bill,89 which was endorsed by the Department of Jus-
tice,90 proposed to amend section 2 of the Expediting Act and fol-
lowed closely on the heels of S. 1811. It would leave the three-judge 
provision of section I intact; consequently, if the Attorney General 
certified that the case was of general public importance before the 
entry of final judgment, then a three-judge court would be convened 
to hear the case. Under section 2, if the Attorney General or the 
district court, either on its own motion or on the application of a 
party, filed an expediting certificate at any time within thirty days 
84. S. 1811, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963). 
85. 109 CoNG. RI:c. 11911-12 (1963) (remarks of Senator Johnston). 
86. Ibid. 
87. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
88. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT 131 (1952); Solomon, 
supra note 63. This also seems to have been implied by Mr. Justice Harlan himself in 
his Brown Shoe opinion. 370 U.S. at 364 (1962) (separate opinion). 
89. S. 1892, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963). 
90. JUDICIAL CoNFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT 76 (1963). 
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after final judgment, an appeal from the final decision of the single 
district court judge would lie directly to the Supreme Court. But so 
long as neither the Attorney General nor the district court filed an 
expediting certificate, final and interlocutory appeals would lie to 
the court of appeals. This bill was not reported out of Committee 
and has not as yet been reintroduced in the 89th Congress. The Ju-
dicial Conference approved it, but suggested that it be amended to 
require the Attorney General to obtain leave of court in order to 
certify the case as one of general public importance,91 thereby sub-
jecting any right of direct appeal from the final decision of a single 
district judge to the discretion of the judiciary. As the bill last stood, 
however, the district judge had no such discretion. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
It seems clear that a number of antitrust cases are appealed di-
rectly to the Supreme Court which are not within the intended pur-
view of the Expediting Act. Some issues which come before the 
Court involve disputes over procedural matters, while others merely 
raise questions of the correctness of findings of fact. These cases 
could be adequately reviewed by the court of appeals. On the other 
hand, some government civil antitrust cases will continue to raise 
questions of importance within the original spirit of the act; and for 
these cases a benefit to the public and considerable saving in both 
time and money to the parties can be realized by allowing expedi-
tion to a final determination. Considering the sparing use that is 
made of the three-judge district court provision, it seems reasonable 
to conclude that there is no abuse of discretion in its use. 
These conclusions do not support an argument for repeal of the 
act; however, they do indicate that certain modifications might be 
beneficial. The necessary modifications seem adequately expressed 
in the last mentioned bill, S. 1892. Under this bill, because there 
is no automatic direct appeal to the Supreme Court, many gov-
ernment civil antitrust cases would be appealed through the courts 
of appeals, with full benefit of interlocutory appellate procedures. 
In those cases which are considered out of the ordinary and deserv-
ing of direct review in the Supreme Court because vital issues which 
may affect the nation's economy are involved, expedition procedure 
will be available. 
The advisability of incorporating the amendment to S. 1892 sug-
gested by the Judicial Conference is questionable. That amendment 
would vest absolute discretion for expedition in the hands of a single 
district judge, some of whom have seen few antitrust cases. Presum-
ably the Attorney General's selection of cases to be brought is in the 
public interest, and he is arguably in a better position to evaluate 
91. Ibid. 
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which will raise novel issues as opposed to merely routine enforce-
ment matters. However, for reasons not completely altruistic, the 
Justice Department on some occasions may feel it desirable to slow 
down the ultimate determination of a case. The provision in S. 1892 
permitting the district court either on its own motion or on the ap-
plication of a party likewise to file an expediting certificate should 
counter-balance this potential advantage of the Justice Department. 
Robert C. Bonges 
APPENDIX I-' 
The following table shows the time intervals from the decision of the district court to the decision on appeal in the antitrust cases heardl and 
Nl 
Cjl 
decided in the Supreme Court during the calendar years 1954-1963. ,.j::,,. 
Length in months 
District Court 
Type of case Court2 of Ap- District 
to peals Court 
Govern- Court to Su- to Su-
ment Crim- ofAp- preme preme 
Case Citation Civil Private F. T. C. inal peals Court Court 
196] ~ .... 
C") 
United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank 374 U.S. 321 X 17 ;;:s-. 
United States v. Singer Mfg. Co. 374 U.S. 174 X 13 i' 
Silver v. New York Stock Exch. 373 U.S. 341 X IO 13 23 ;;g 
White Motor Co. v. United States 372 U.S. 253 X 23 
United States v. National Dairy Prod. Corp. 372 U.S. 29 xa 23 l:-"I ~ 
FTC v. Sun Oil Co. 371 U.S. 505 X 30 18 48 ~ 




Los Angeles Meat 8:: Provision Drivers Union 
.... 
~ 
v. United States 371 U.S. 94 X 17 ~ 
United States v. Loew's, Inc. 371 U.S. 38 X 23 
Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide 8:: 
Carbon Corp. 370 U.S. 690 X N.A.4 
United States v. Borden Co. 370 U.S. 460 X 16 
United States v. Wise 370 U.S. 405 xa 12 
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States 370 U.S. 294 X 31 
Sunkist Growers, Inc. v. Winckler 8:: Smith 1 Citrus Prod. Co. 370 U.S. 19 X N.A. 
United States v. Diebold, Inc. 369 U.S. 654 X 14 01 
Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. 368 U.S. 464 X 17 
..,. 
15 32 ;.:. 
FTC v. Henry Broch 8:: Co. 368 U.S. 360 X N.A. t: 
0 
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Type of case Court2 of Ap· District 
to peals Court 
Govern- Court to Su- to Su-
ment Crim- ofAp- preme preme 
Case Citation Civil Private F. T. C. inal peals Court Court 
1961 
~ United States v. E. I. DuPont DeNemours ~ 
& Co. 366 U.S. 316 X 18 .,.,. .... 
Tampa Elcc. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co. 365 U.S. 320 X 17 IO 27 .,.,. ~ 
Turpentine & Rosin Factors, Inc. v. ~ 
United States 365 U.S. 298 X 6 .,.,. 
Eastern R.R. President's Conference v. t:t-J 
Noerr Motor Freight, Inc. 365 U.S. 127 X 26 14 40 ~ 
United States v. Parke, Davis & Co. 365 U.S. 125 X 6 ~ (1) 
Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & ~ .... 
Coke Co. 364 U.S. 656 X IO 12 22 .,.,. .... 
~ 
1960 ()'q 
FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. 363 U.S. 536 X 19 14 33 ~ 
FTC v. Henry Broch & Co. 363 U.S. 166 X 12 18 30 <:") .,.,. 
Maryland & Va. Milk Prod. Ass'n v. 
United States 362 U.S. 458 X 16 
United States v. Parke, Davis & Co. 362 U.S. 29 X 19 
1959 
Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States 360 U.S. 395 X IO 8 18 
FTC v. Simplicity Pattern Co., Inc. 360 U.S. 55 X 14 13 27 
Melrose Distillers, Inc. v. United States 359 U.S. 271 X 7 8 15 
Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc. 359 U.S. 207 X N.A. ..... 
United States v. Radio Corp. of America 358 U.S. 334 X 13 N) 
International Boxing Club v. United States 358 U.S. 242 X 18 (.;l (.;l 
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District Court 
Type of case Court2 of Ap- District 
to peals Court 
Govern- Court to Su- to Su-
ment Crim- ofAp- preme preme 
Case Citation Civil Private F. T. C. inal peals Court Court 
1958 
Guerlain, Inc. v. United States 358 U.S. 915 X 17 
United States v. National Malleable&: ~ 
Steel Casting Co. 358 U.S. 38 X 9 .... ~ 
Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States 356 U.S. I X 21 ~ 
Moog Indus., Inc. v. FTC 355 U.S. 4ll X 19 14 33 i' 
FTC v. Standard Oil Co. 355 U.S. 396 X 16 20 36 
Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Vance 355 U.S. 389 X II 13 24 
;:g 
Nashville Milk Co. v. Carnation Co. 355 U.S. 373 X N.A. ~ 
~ 
1957 ~ 
Nationwide Trailer Rental Sys., Inc. v. 
~ United States 355 U.S. IO X 27 Cl) 
New Orleans Ins. Exch. v. United States 355 U.S. 22 X 8 <::! 
United States v. E.I. DuPont DeNemours &: Co. 353 U.S. 586 X 30 
.... 
Cl) 
Lawlor v. National Screen Serv. Corp. 352 U.S. 992 X 63 4 67 ~ 
Radovich v. National Football League 352 U.S. 445 X N.A. 
FTC v. National Lead Co. 352 U.S. 419 X 35 14 49 
FTC v. American Crayon Co. 352 U.S. 806 X N.A. 
United Liquors Corp. v. United States 352 U.S. 991 X 8 
1956 
Holophane Co., Inc. v. United States 352 U.S. 903 X 33 
1 United States v. E. I. DuPont DeNemours &: Co. 351 U.S. 377 X 30 United States v. McKesson &: Robbins, Inc. 351 U.S. 305 X 35 a, 
1955 ::" 
United States v. International Boxing Club 348 U.S. 236 X 12 ~ .... 
United States v. Shubert 348 U.S. 222 X 13 0 
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District Court 
Type of case Court2 of Ap- District 
to peals Court 
Govern- Court to Su- to Su-
ment Crim- ofAp- preme preme 
Case Citation Civil Private F. T. C. inal peals Court Court 
1954 
Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread Co. 348 U.S. 115 X N.A. 
United Shoe Mach. Corp. v. United States 347 U.S. 521 X 15 
United States v. Borden Co. 347 U.S. 514 X 14 
United States v. Employing Lathers Ass'nli 347 U.S. 198 X 8 
Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount 
Film Distrib. Corp. 346 U.S. 537 X N.A. 
Median 
TOTALS 31 17 Interval 
Median 
14 17 13 27 Interval 
Median 
9 19 14 33 Interval 
4 
1. This table includes within the antitrust cases which were appealed under the Expediting Act those cases in which the Supreme Court's deci-
sion merely consisted of sustaining a motion to affirm the trial court's decision. However, cases appealed under the Expediting Act which raised 
only questions of federal procedure were not included. E.g., Sam Fox Publishing Co. v. United States, 366 U.S. 683 (1961) (time interval from 
district court to Supreme Court was 18 months); United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677 (1958) (time interval from district court to 
Supreme Court was 21 months). With regard to non-Expediting Act cases, the table does not include those in which the Supreme Court merely de-
nied an application for a writ of certiorari, nor does it include cases raising only questions of federal procedure. E.g., Goldlawr, Inc, v. Heiman, 
369 U.S. 463 (1962); Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959). 
2. Or the Federal Trade Commission where appropriate. 
3. This case was appealed directly to the Supreme Court under the Criminal Appeals Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1958), 
4. The date of the district court's decision was not available. Consequently, it was impossible to determine the length of time required to 
appeal the case. 
5. This case was tried and appealed together with United States v. Employing Plasterers Ass'n, 347 U.S. 186 (1954). For purposes of tabulation 
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